论坛日程
19:30-21:00 | The Role of Financial Incentives in Health Care Policy 主讲人:Pai Steven Xu,香港大学商学院 |
21:00-22:30 | M&A: Why Do Deals Fail? 主讲人:Peter Lu,Baker McKenzie高级合伙人 |
22:30-24:00 | Political Incentives, Tournament Competition and GDP Manipulation: Evidence from Chinese Cities 主讲人:Lixin Colin Xu,世界银行 |
会议地点: 微软 Teams
2021年12月9日(星期四) 19:30-21:00 (北京时间)
The Role of Financial Incentives in Health Care Policy
主讲人:Pai Steven Xu
内容概要:
This talk will explain our research on two China’s national policies concerning health care. Our focus is on how the financial incentives may be twisted in the system and thus work against the policymakers from achieving the original goals at outset. First, we use the patient level data to study the effect of the Zero Markup Drug Policy. We investigate how the policy has changed the financial incentives so that the hospital managed to survive from this structural change. We find that the monetary reward of patient care was redirected to capital rather than professional skills by the policy. Second, we focus on the role of primary care in the medical services offered to the rural areas in China by examining the effectiveness of alternative policy options aiming to improve health care accessibility to the poor. In particular, we find current policy effectively reduces the cost sharing to the poor for their hospitalization treating severe conditions. This is shown not the way to help the poor, as it twisted the incentive for the poor to have the problem treated in early stages.
个人简介:
香港大学商学院副教授。 研究领域为产业组织,尤其是大型市场中拍卖数据和其他数据集的结构分析。 目前,他发表的论文考察了拍卖模式的两个方面:内生进入和信息聚合。他的研究还涵盖了劳动力市场的定向搜索、数字市场的定价策略、新兴非政府组织市场的竞争、信息传输和止赎销售效率。 他的研究始终着重于加强理论模型和数据之间的联系。
2021年12月9日(星期四) 21:00-22:30 (北京时间)
M&A: Why Do Deals Fail
主讲人:Peter Lu
内容概要:
Corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) can take a company from zero to hero overnight. But while M&A can transform a company's growth prospects, financial performance and long-term outlook, it is not without risk. If it were easy, everyone would be doing it. Unfortunately, plenty can go wrong when acquiring a company - from failing to consider what is actually included in the price tag, to problems with post acquisition integration. This seminar will explore the biggest problems and pitfalls for parties engaging in M&A activity, from strategy, negotiation, due diligence and more. It will also consider some of the biggest case studies where things didn't work out as planned - such as HP's eyewatering $8.8 billion write-down, or the (in)famous Rolls Royce-Volkswagen deal illustrating the value in properly conducting due diligence. The seminar is targeted to students interested in learning more about commercial law and business practice.
个人简介:
Baker McKenzie高级合伙人,为中国客户最具战略意义、最敏感和最雄心勃勃的任务提供咨询,特别关注公司事务、复杂的重组和战略诉讼。 他的客户包括世界500强企业、皇家特许公司以及中国银行、中国太平保险、华彬投资、中国海陵集团、中国传媒集团、中国电信、海信国际、工商银行、英国标准协会和中非棉花等基金。 Peter Lu曾在北京大学、清华大学、中国银行保险监督管理委员会(CBIRC)和中国银行教授并购和治理课程。 Peter Lu是英国历史最悠久的职业领袖组织-董事协会(IoD City Branch)的委员会成员。他还应邀在英国议会中就英中贸易问题以及最近的NSI法案问题作证。
2021年12月9日(星期四) 22:30-24:00 (北京时间)
Political Incentives, Tournament Competition and GDP Manipulation: Evidence from Chinese Cities
主讲人:Lixin Colin Xu
内容概要:
The literature underscores the positive role of high-powered incentives to Chinese local officials in promoting local economic growth. In this paper, we examine how the same incentives lead to the manipulation of growth statistics as well. Using satellites-recorded lights as a benchmark, we derive a novel measure of GDP manipulation, and link it with local officials’ career incentives based on a comprehensive dataset of prefecture-level cities during 2001–2013. We find a significant political cycle effect, where over-reporting increases over the course of the first term of the party secretary and peaks around the 5th year, the last year of the term. Further spatial econometric analysis reveals a large and positive neighborhood effect on over-reporting for peer cities. Over-reporting indeed is associated with higher chances of promotion, and that both ratchet effect and turnover effect may exist in the manipulation game. These findings point to tournament competition as the key mechanism for GDP manipulation.
个人简介:
世界银行发展研究组首席经济学家。 北京大学和芝加哥大学毕业后,1996年加入世界银行研究组。 目前的研究主要集中在发展、冲突、经济史、公司治理、治理与制度、政治经济学、文化变迁和转型中的中国经济等应用微观经济学课题。 他的文章发表在American Economic Review, American Economic Review (papers and proceedings), Review of Econ. & Statistics, J. of Financial Econ., J. Public Econ., J. Labor Econ., J. Law and Econ., J. Development Econ., and J. Comparative Econ。他的论文在发展、转型和中国领域被广泛引用。