基地动态

This paper explores how marital commitment influences a couple’s post-marriage investment in common assets. Different from previous studies that assumed complete information within marriage, we have developed a game model that takes into account the signaling behavior when spouses operate under incomplete information. Utilising data from the China Family Panel Studies (CFPS) from 2010 to 2016 and treating the implementation of the new Marriage Law in 2011 as an external shock, we identified this signaling behavior and find that, on average, the legal shock boosted couple’s joint ownership of houses by 6.1%. This finding remains robust under various tests, including using the number of “jinshi” in local history to proxy the prevalence of Confucian culture as the instrumental variables. Furthermore, we offer evidence that elucidates the mechanism behind the effect: the legal shock reduced the level of commitment between spouses, with the house serving as a “signaling vehicle” from husband to wife. Our findings highlight the importance of commitment in household welfare and provide a new perspective on understanding marriage law and spousal interaction in China. 

包坤，北京交通大学经济管理学院助理教授。博士毕业于英国诺丁汉大学商学院，博士期间受诺丁汉大学“校长奖学金”及国家留学基金委公派全额资助。诺丁汉中国研究中心成员。主持校级人才项目及企业横向项目，参与多项国家自然/社会科学基金项目。主要研究兴趣为家庭经济学、发展经济学以及公司金融。