The "open competition mechanism" system is not the only mechanism, it needs to be used in conjunction with other funding methods in China's research funding system, and the choice should be rational according to the characteristics of the funding method and the funding target.
This year's government work report proposes to "reform the implementation of major science and technology projects and promote mechanisms including the open competition mechanism". The Outline of the 14th Five-Year Plan of the National Economic and Social Development of the People's Republic of China and the Vision 2035 also proposes to "reform the major science and technology projects are set up and organised and managed, give more autonomy to research units and researchers, implement the system of chief technical officers, and implement systems including the 'open competition mechanism'".
The "open competition mechanism" system has received widespread attention since its first introduction in 2016, and has been implemented nationwide in succession.
However, the way in which this is implemented varies greatly from place to place, particularly in terms of list setting. The generalisation of the open competition mechanism will affect its functioning and is not conducive to the operation of the entire science and technology management system. It is therefore important to clarify which research projects are suitable for the open competition mechanism.
The "open competition mechanism" is a results-based approach to research funding, which is effective in solving scientific and technological problems where the objectives are clear but the path to achieve them is not.
Based on these characteristics, three basic questions should be considered to determine which research projects are suitable for the open competition mechanism: what is the nature of the problem for which the solution is sought; how many participants are likely to be committed to the work; and whether they are willing and able to take risks.
Specific, targeted, transformative and achievable outcomes
Whether the objectives of a research project are concrete and measurable, or abstract and difficult to measure, is the primary consideration in choosing an open competition mechanism. Specifically, is the research objective measurable? Is it transformative? Can it be achieved within a reasonable timeframe? If the answer to all these questions is 'yes', then the prerequisites for the implementation of the open competition mechanism are in place. As General Secretary Xi Jinping said, "It is possible to explore the open competition mechanism to open up a list of key core technology projects that are in demand. Heroes will be unveiled regardless of their origins, and whoever is capable will unveil the list." The 'key' and 'core' here require the objectives of the research project to be ground-breaking and transformative, and how to examine 'competence' requires the project objectives to be specific and measurable. As an example, in 2019 Hubei Province released 41 technology-based unveiling projects, involving breakthroughs in a number of high-tech fields including information electronics and aerospace, and specific technical index requirements were clearly given, as well as completion deadlines for the projects.
Moderate number of potential unveilers or prefer more to less
The second issue to consider when deciding on the open competition mechanism is the number of potential unveilers of the research project. This issue relates to the measurement of the costs and benefits of the open competition mechanism. The cost of organising an "open competition mechanism" includes not only the direct funding of the project, but also a certain amount of administrative costs, which go beyond the usual funding methods in order to obtain additional benefits, for example the best solution. When there are fewer potential unveilers for a research project, there may be no one to fill the position or insufficient competition, and adopting an open competition mechanism at this point would risk high costs and low returns. For example, for a difficult mathematical conjecture that only few mathematicians can prove, the best way to fund it would be to directly fund it through the purchase of technical results or by commissioning research and development to avoid the overhead costs caused by a series of operations such as list finding, list issuing, list unveiling and list evaluation. Therefore, when adopting the open competition mechanism, it is important to ascertain whether there is a certain number of potential candidates to ensure that the benefits of the open competition mechanism are realised and that the best solution will be selected.
Willingness and ability of potential unveilers in taking risks
The final question to consider when choosing the open competition mechanism is whether the potential unveilers are willing and able to take the corresponding risks. This issue relates to the weighing of the costs and benefits of participating in the open competition mechanism. The costs faced by potential unveilers include financial and time costs, and the possible benefits include direct outcome benefits and additional commercial or social benefits. As the open competition mechanism is a results-based system, the reward is not always completely rewarding. Therefore, list revealers need to be willing and able to bear a certain level of risk in revealing the list, including upfront pre-research costs and sunk costs associated with a failed reveal. For this issue, on the one hand, there is a need to provide research projects with clear technical requirements and a clear time frame for the task in order to reduce the risk perception of potential list revealers. On the other hand, for difficult, uncertain and public interest research projects, there is a need to reduce the risk of potential unveilers by means of the "open competition mechanism", together with the achievement procurement or advance market commitments.
In brief, the "open competition mechanism" is the best funding tool when the problem to be solved is a clear objective and attracts a large number of competent and risk-taking participants. However, it is not the only tool, and needs to be used in conjunction with other funding methods in China's research funding system, chosen appropriately according to the characteristics of the funding method and the target group.
Jingjing Zeng, PhD in Management, Postdoctoral Fellow in Applied Economics, "Wenlan Young Scholar" of ZUEL, Associate Professor of School of Public Administration, IIDPF researcher, PhD Supervisor. Dr. Zeng is also an appointed expert of the Asian Development Bank, a researcher of the Institute of Local Government at Florida State University, a member of the Board of Directors of the Chinese Association for Science of Science and S&T Policy and the Deputy Secretary-General of the Hubei Association for Science of Science and S&T Policy.