Trends

Forum Schedule

Conference venue: Microsoft Teams

  【1】Thursday, 9 December 2021 19:30-21:00 (BST)

  The Role of Financial Incentives in Health Care Policy

Presenter: Pai Steven Xu

  Abstract:

  This talk will explain our research on two China’s national policies concerning health care. Our focus is on how the financial incentives may be twisted in the system and thus work against the policymakers from achieving the original goals at outset. First, we use the patient level data to study the effect of the Zero Markup Drug Policy. We investigate how the policy has changed the financial incentives so that the hospital managed to survive from this structural change. We find that the monetary reward of patient care was redirected to capital rather than professional skills by the policy. Second, we focus on the role of primary care in the medical services offered to the rural areas in China by examining the effectiveness of alternative policy options aiming to improve health care accessibility to the poor. In particular, we find current policy effectively reduces the cost sharing to the poor for their hospitalization treating severe conditions. This is shown not the way to help the poor, as it twisted the incentive for the poor to have the problem treated in early stages.

  Brief Bio:

  Associate Professor at the School of Business, University of Hong Kong. His research area is industrial organisation, in particular the structural analysis of auction data and other datasets in large markets. His current publications examine two aspects of auction models: endogenous entry and information aggregation. His research also covers targeted search in labour markets, pricing strategies in digital markets, competition in emerging NGO markets, information transmission and foreclosure sale efficiency. His research has always focused on strengthening the links between theoretical models and data.

  【2】Thursday 9 December 2021 21:00 - 22:30 (BST)

  M&A: Why Do Deals Fail

Presenter: Peter Lu

  Abstract:

  Corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A) can take a company from zero to hero overnight. But while M&A can transform a company's growth prospects, financial performance and long-term outlook, it is not without risk. If it were easy, everyone would be doing it. Unfortunately, plenty can go wrong when acquiring a company - from failing to consider what is actually included in the price tag, to problems with post acquisition integration. This seminar will explore the biggest problems and pitfalls for parties engaging in M&A activity, from strategy, negotiation, due diligence and more. It will also consider some of the biggest case studies where things didn't work out as planned - such as HP's eyewatering $8.8 billion write-down, or the (in)famous Rolls Royce-Volkswagen deal illustrating the value in properly conducting due diligence. The seminar is targeted to students interested in learning more about commercial law and business practice.

  Brief Bio:

  Senior Partner at Baker McKenzie, advising Chinese clients on their most strategic, sensitive and ambitious assignments, with a particular focus on corporate matters, complex restructurings and strategic litigation. His clients include Fortune 500 companies, Royal Charter companies and funds such as Bank of China, China Taiping Insurance, Huabin Investment, China Hailing Group, China Media Group, China Telecom, Hisense International, ICBC, British Standards Institution and China-Africa Cotton. Peter Lu has taught M&A and governance courses at Peking University, Tsinghua University, the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission (CBIRC) and Bank of China. Peter Lu is a committee member of the Institute of Directors (IoD City Branch), the UK's oldest professional leadership organisation. He has also been invited to testify in the UK Parliament on UK-China trade issues and more recently on the NSI Act.

  【3】Thursday 9 December 2021 22:30 - 24:00 (BST)

  Political Incentives, Tournament Competition and GDP Manipulation: Evidence from Chinese Cities

Presenter: Lixin Colin Xu

  Abstract:

  The literature underscores the positive role of high-powered incentives to Chinese local officials in promoting local economic growth. In this paper, we examine how the same incentives lead to the manipulation of growth statistics as well. Using satellites-recorded lights as a benchmark, we derive a novel measure of GDP manipulation, and link it with local officials’ career incentives based on a comprehensive dataset of prefecture-level cities during 2001–2013. We find a significant political cycle effect, where over-reporting increases over the course of the first term of the party secretary and peaks around the 5th year, the last year of the term. Further spatial econometric analysis reveals a large and positive neighborhood effect on over-reporting for peer cities. Over-reporting indeed is associated with higher chances of promotion, and that both ratchet effect and turnover effect may exist in the manipulation game. These findings point to tournament competition as the key mechanism for GDP manipulation.

  Brief Bio:

  Principal Economist in the Development Research Group of the World Bank. After graduating from Beijing University and the University of Chicago, he joined the World Bank's Research Group in 1996. His current research focuses on applied microeconomics topics such as development, conflict, economic history, corporate governance, governance and institutions, political economy, cultural change and the Chinese economy in transition. His articles have appeared in American Economic Review, American Economic Review (papers and proceedings), Review of Econ. & Statistics, J. of Financial Econ. His papers have been widely cited in the fields of development, transition and China.