Recently, the paper entitled "A helping hand for the regulator: The role of industry associations in firm water pollution abatement in China", co-authored by Yang Mengjun, a researcher at the Center for International Cooperation and Disciplinary Innovation of Income Distribution and Public Finance under the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, was officially published in Issue 137 (2026) of the Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (JEEM), a top journal in environmental economics. This journal is dedicated to publishing original, high-level research on natural resources and environmental issues, employing modern economic theory and rigorous quantitative methods. It is recognized internationally as a leading journal in environmental and resource economics, and is classified as a Class A academic journal by our university.
As global industrialization and urbanization continue to advance, water pollution control faces tremendous challenges. Formal environmental regulation, such as government enforcement, is often constrained by the high costs of monitoring and by firms' strategic avoidance behaviors. Drawing on the China Industrial Enterprise Database and the China Enterprise Pollution Database from 1998 to 2013, this paper applies a multi-period difference-in-differences approach to investigate the influence of industry associations—as an informal environmental regulatory force—on enterprises' efforts to reduce water pollution. The study finds that the establishment of industry associations leads to a significant reduction in chemical oxygen demand (COD) emissions among firms within the industry, with an average reduction of 9.9%. Mechanism analysis reveals that industry associations achieve emission reductions through a three-pronged approach: source reduction (lowering pollutant generation), process optimization (improving management efficiency), and end-of-pipe treatment (increasing removal rates). Further analysis indicates that the governance effect of industry associations is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises, traditional industries, and in regions characterized by lower levels of digitalization and limited market potential. Moreover, this paper confirms a complementary relationship between informal and formal environmental regulations: the impact of industry associations on pollution control becomes more pronounced when government supervision is stronger or political incentives are more evident. This paper provides robust micro-level evidence supporting the tripartite collaborative governance framework of "government-association-enterprise" and enriches the theory of informal environmental regulation and institutional complementarity.
About the Author:
Yang Mengjun is an associate professor (tenure-track) at the School of Economics, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, a master's supervisor, a researcher at the Center for International Cooperation and Disciplinary Innovation of Income Distribution and Public Finance under the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security, and a Young Scholar of the Wenlan Scholar Program. His current research primarily focuses on the intersection of innovation economics, urban economics, and industrial economics. In recent years, his related achievements have been published in leading academic journals in China and abroad, including the Journal of Management World, The Journal of World Economy, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, and China Economic Review.